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•SOME EVIDENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY, 1861-5.
Political pressure began on the aflllY before the hattie of
BIIII HUll. The enlisted men were 11lustered in for only three
months and "Cencral Scott is urged lIot to lose their services,
bllt to gel into Richmond before they arc disbanded.''' The
political leaders looked I1p011 the war as a short affair and really
compelled the military men to move" 11 to Ri.chmoncl." This
cry forced Scott to go before he was ready and partly accounts
for the panic after the battle.:
\rhell ~lcClcJ1all took charge of the army it was in a pretty
badly demoralized condition. "The best troops in the world
officcred as these wcre by the \-icious system of election, would
fail the bes.t general.") )'lcClellan says they roamed around
\Vashington at will and were drunken and disorderly: Sherman
contradicts this in part. saying, "\Ve had a good organization,
good men. but no cohesion, no real discipline, no respect for
authority, 110 real knowledge of war.'·~ He is the only one I
have found who is willing to say anything in favor of the organi-
zation, while Russell contradicts this. It may be questioned
how there could be a good organization and at the same time no
respect for authority. II\Vhen I assumed command it was clear
that a prompt advance was wholly impracticable. 1~ * * I
repeat that it was not worthy to be called an army...• ::\fcClellan
lays due emphasis upon the disastrous effects that defeat had on
the army, for in this is his justification for slowness, :'\Iichie
says his task was full of difficulties. Hespecially is this so in a
government by the people where newspaper editors and other
self-constituted exponents of public opinion are first in the field
with their impatient suggestions; the personal influence, excrted
through potent political leaders, for rank and command can not
always bc ignored,lIT
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:;\IcClellan now began by patient \vork to create his army
but he did 110t get it created before the politicians got ready to
use it, and his further insistence on delay paved the way for
disc01l1cnt.' :;\1 cClellan kept his councils to himself and kept
011 at his work and his drilling. That he was making an efficient
army is generally admitted, though Sherman. and Nicolay and
I-]ay try to cast doubt 011 it.z
At any rate the Coulltry ",vanted him to do something. and
by December 1st President Lincoln became nervous and sub-
mitted a plan of campaign to l\IcClel1an. In December :\IcClcl-
Jan fell sick and the President called in various military men to
get their opinions 011 his plan. 'They all agreed it was a good
one. rvicClelJan got well and attended one of these conferences.
He treated the whole matter with coolness, and this aroused
Chase, who asked him point blank what hc intcndcd to do and
when he was going to do it. :I\IcClellan gave Chase to under-
stand it was none of his business, but satisfied Lincoln that he
had a plan in mind.3
III the meantime there was a strong demand made on the
President and cabinet that somcthing be done.' "Instead of one
mind there were many minds influencing the management of
military affairs." ~ ~lcClel1an made no move except to disagree
with the President on the plan suggested and finally Lincoln
ordered the ar1111 to move by February 22nd. \;Vhether or not
]\1-cClellan ,vas justified in waiting until he felt his army was
satisfactory is a question that military men do not agree upon.
At any rate l\fcClelian felt so justified and was "the only one who
did not seem to feel the full force of the public demand." ~
Barnard, ~IcClelian's chief engineer, says .:\IcClellan should
have made a light draft of men and "should do somcthing."l
Granting that no great movement could be made during the
winter, he should do something or "hl': would find himself vir-
tually destitute of power to carry out his plans when the moment
proper for s\lch a movement should arri,'e, and so it happened."ll
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But it was sOIllcl'hing- like Hull Run that '\lcClcllan feared.
Before he lllO\'C(1. I'half of Cong-rcs:o:. was opposed to .\kClcllan's
plan and looked 011 him with distrust.':: * * "'hell the army
was to go by .\ll11apolis, J felt confident that olle-half would no
sooner be embarked than the other would be ordered back to
\\'ashillg'LOn." and he adds: "Xo olle living in \VashingLOIl could
doubt this,'" \rebh thinks :\Id"kllan did 110t sill)\\" dash enough
to hold confidence. He further thinks "he did 110t gi,'c to the
will of the President and the demands of the people the weight
to which they were entitled'" ~ but in ,'jew of the fact that neither
Presidellt 1101' people knew anything abollt war, it is plainly a
question how far he should rely on them.
HAnd nOw it came to be commented upon that '\lcClellanJ s
adherents were men who werc politically opposed to the admin-
istration. On the other hand the radical lcaders who clesired
speedy action found that other gcnerals werc 1I0t in accord with
the commanding general's policy of inaction." 3 Lord Lyons
Wfotc his homc gO\'ernment :::\ovember J7, J862, that '\fcClelian
was regarded as the represelltati\-e of the conservative principle
ill the army.l By mixing political convictions with professional
obligations. he "Ctlt from under his feet that finn political support
which was so esscntial for a continuance in active militan- COI11-
mand." ~
".\11 the so-called interference. all the real intcrference \vith
~JcClellan's plans-all the want of confidence ill his ability as a
leader of an active army-all the want of faith in his intentions
to fully :-;upport the "iews of the gO\'crnmcnt, arose from the
belief that ill and abollt '\IcClellan's headquarters there was a
lack of faith in thc go,'crnl1lcnt and of sympathy with thc admin-
istration." <I \\'hatcvcr the cause it seems pretty concll1si\"c that
the radical leaders ha"ing failed to force 1\IcClellan to attack the
Southern army. 110W sought to discredit him. and. possibly, as he
claims, ruin him. "I-la,-ing failed to force me to ach'ance at a
time when an ad,'ancc would ha\'c bccn madncss. thc)' withheld
the llleans of succcss when I came ill contact with thr enemy.";
, J:arn;lI-d. !,.
~\Y.'lJl,.lli!J, 1,:t,
; \1 i,·hlt,. 1.-,0_
, Hurll:lnl. ;;,.; .
• :\llt-hle-. -I,:. .
• \Yl'1)I" I(W,
; )Jd'I.,Il(lIl. );;0.
66 Edward Mdlah(}I/
I;knkcr':-" di"i:->iOll was (irst laken aw;ty from him and assig-ned
to Fn..'1l101lt·S Ill'W Ilwtllllain di,·isioll.' Lilll'olll wrute .\IcC\c:lIan
ill a Iclt~r dated .;\larcl1 31. I Sf.2. "if you nHlIl! knu\\' the full prcs-
:'olIn,' nf the case I alll slIre yOIl woul<1 jl1~lify it.·· ~ Later on .\Ie-
nowell's corps was taken fro111 f\IcC1cllan and of this "'ebb save;:
"The gO\'crlllllcnt (for it was not Lincoln alone. but Secretaries
Cha:::l' and Stanton and CCllcrals II itchcuck and Thomas. and
",hoc\-cr else were ill the secret cOllncil) the go\'crnmcnl. we H.'-
peat. was responsible for this ~talc of thin~s'" ~ He then goes on
to say \\'ashingtoll could be defended without thC5(' men and that
if :\IcClcllan kept the Rebels acti,'c \\'ashillgLOll was in no dan~
ger. \\'ithol1t them there was no show for \IcClellan to keep
the Rebels occupied.' \\'ebb calls it the greatest blunder that
could ha\'e been permitted, "But with a blind indifference to
whateyer might result from it these men pcr~uad('d the Presi-
dent to cripple the army sent out on a special mission * * *'
and did everything to insure disaster to the Peninsula Cam-
paign.":' \Vebb also complains that ~IcClellan was further hin-
dered by appointing foreigners on his staff to the exclusion of
intelligent Americans. This was done he claims by the gO\'ern-
ment." i\lcCul1och seems to think politics had something to do
with ~lcClellan's retirement, for he speaks of it as a political
necessity, and Pinkerton, who was closely associated with '\fc-
ClCllan, says he was "subjected to the prosecution"i oi the mo!'t
1l1alig-nant political intriguers," 7
Speaking of Secretary Cameron, '\[cClcllan says: "1 conld
not always dispose of arms and supplie~ as [ thought the good
of the service demanded. For instance. when a shipment of Ull-
usually good arms arrived from Europe, and r wi:o;hed them for
the army of the Potomac, I found that they had b,,'cn promised
to some political friend, As 1 had no idea who might be
selected in '\I.r. Cameron's place and a~ he Stlppoftc-d mc in
purely military afiairs, T objected to his remo\':11 and san:-d him."
:BUl he was later removed. "Instead of using his (Stanton's)
new position to assist m(: he threw c\'cry ob~tack in 111\' way,
and did all in his power to create difficulty and distrll~t between
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thl' I'rc~i{lclll and 1llY~clf. ~: * '" nefo!"c aclllalh- C0111-
-Illt'!lI.:cd the I \~l1ill:O;llla Campaign I had lost that cordial ~upport
t)f the Ex('ent i,-c which wa~ necessary to attain Sl1ccc~:,"" :\1 ichic
:o;.a~-s StantOI1 "was alway:-; a potellt factor in the C01Hluct of mili-
tary operations," and "tillable to understand the calise of :\Ic-
Clellan's inacti,-iL\", he SCon became an aeLi,'c allv of the C0111-
- -
mittce 011 tile condl1ct of the war and opposed. though not always
openly. )']cC!cllan's plan of campaign"- 2
After the conference held between 1'lcC1cl1all. \IcDowell.
Franklin. Cha~e. StanIon and Lincoln. in which the President's
plan was discussed. "the lines were 1110re closely drawn between
those who defended and those who opposed him C\lcClellan).
many men of influence in the councils of the nation publicly
assailed him, ,·igorously denounced his lethargy and incapacity.
and some e,-cn went so far as to question the purity of his mo-
ti,-es by cxpressing doubt as to his loyalty:' '·The committee
on the conduct of the war was casting discredit upon him and
undermining his influence in the suggestions and doubts pro-
mulgated during the examination of his subordinates,'· ~ "But
Stanton's intemperate haste to have the army move somehow or
somewhere gave the latter (l\IcClellan) the opportunity to get
his army away from the politicians at \Vashingtol1, which his
controling desire too eagerly embraced at the sacrifice of his
usual prudence and cool jtH!gmcnt.'·' \IVebb also traces the il1-
Aucncc of this committee and says the chairman, vVadc, "de-
manded" that the blockade of the Potomac be raised and "used
pretty strong and emphatic language" on the subject in the pres-
ence of the Secretary of \Var anel General McClellan. Well
might l\lcClcllan refer to ·'geese" in high places. ~Iichie speaks
of the committee on the conduct of the war as men '·without
military education" who soon felt "sufficient confidence in their
military perception" to not need military edllcation.~ "r'he com-
mittee was "composed of men not only ignorant but unconscious
of their ignorance:· The)' soon had plans of their own which
they soon found witnesses to fortify, They were of "restle%
activity and radical "iev'is:' convinced "that acts oi Congress
could create disciplined armies Ollt of patriotic ,'olullteers \\'ith-
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out ha\-ing' recourse to the time rcquif'ilC to IJr.!-:"<lnizl'.•Irill and
discipline thelll." These 111CI1 powcrfully inl1ul'llCl'd the I'rc~i­
dent and the Cabinet and the cQulllry. Thrlll1~h thic; cljt1111littcc
the President \\"as inAucllccd to organize the .\1"111y of the l'l)to-
mac into fO\lr corps. ~1,cClcl1al1 protested and wanted him to
wait till the lllen had seen sen'icc in the field, but the l'r('''idclll
would 110t wai1. 1
After the battlc of \Villial11sburg, ~lcClcllall a~kcd pcnlli~­
sion 10 re1110V(; the corps commanders for incompetence. There
\Vere but three corps with him then. Lincoln writes him: ;'T
am constantly told that YOll ha\'c no consultation with tIH:111
(Sumller, Heintzelman and Keyes). \\'hen yOtl rclic\'cd General
Hamilton * * ~" vou lost one of your best friends j'n thl:
~ ~
Senate. But to return; are )'OU strong enough-are you ~troilg­
enough e\-ell with m)' help-to set yOUf foot upon the neck:-; Of
Sumner. Heintzelman and Keyes at once?":
There seems to have been a general tendency among 111ilitar~'
men to ask for e\'erything in sight. ).lcClellan·s trouble with
guns has becn cited. Sherman went to Indiana to get treops
for the Kentucky army and found the Indiana people ccjuipping
and fitting out men, Hbut they were called for as fast as mustered
in, either fOf the army of l\IcClelian or Fremont." .~\t Spring-
field he found the same general activity, Hbut these mCI1 had also
been promised to FrcmoIlL,,;I ;;Since that timc (.~\o\·cmber, I8or)
he (Frcmont) had been without a cOlllmand. T belie\'Cd, as did
many others, tbat political intrigue wa:- keeping- Fremont back." I
Stanton answered Dana February I. 1862. and says: "The
pressure of members of Congress for clerk and army appoint-
ments '* >I: * and the persistent strain again~t all measures
essential. to obtain time for thought. combination and conference.
is discouraging in the extrcmc-it often tempts me to quit thc
helm in despair. \\'hen Stanton went into the \\#ar Department
there was great dissatisfaction in the 'Tribune office with )'Ic-
Clellan," ~ 1\11)' one who will read Dana's .Rccolh:ctiolls ,,"ill. T
think, becol11c cOJ1\"inced that too l11\1ch w('ight wa~ laid on tIl{'
upinion of one man, be he eycr so good and tnll',
: :-;llt~l·ltlUll. I, "".,
• J/lliltl. I', ,\. "ltl'(·"lh'cli.>Il1> ur tl,,- \'1\·11 War," :; .
•
Some Evidence of PoLitics on Efficiency of Army 69
~lcCJcrt1at1c1. an Illinois Democrat, was placed ill cOlllmand
by Lincoln for the political effect he had On the lilillois DCll1o-
cr::ns and the cOllntry generally. Grant kept him as long as he
could for exactly the same reason. Though, if Dana is correct,
he wa~ incompetent and Grant knew it.'
Rhodes tells how i\r cClurc tried to have Lincoln re1110ve Grant
and claimed to represent the friends of the administration, but
] could get 110 more facts 011 this point than Rhodes gi,·cs.2
Tn the case of Bcnj. F. Butler, President Lincoln would not
tell Butler why he was remoycd from New Orleans. It surely
was 110t from lack of confidence, for Lincoln offered to Butler
Grant's command and several others. At least so Butler says.
The Rebels knew Butler was to be removed long before Butler
or his superior did, and Greeley says I<it is probable that the
French l\[inistcr, whose govcrnmcnt had been displeased with
General Butler's management in ~ew Orleans, was the imme-
diate source of rebel assurance on this point.'· 3 Butler blamed
the French ~Iinister and it seems strange that if Bntler did
wrong, Lincoln should be afraid to say so.
John ~I. Schofield's is the only other case I found where
charges of political influcnce wcre made. Schofield was recom-
mended for a }\[ajor-Generalship. He was recommended by
President Lincoln, the Secretary of \!\Tar, Generals Halleck, Grant
and Sherman, but the military committee of the Scnate reported
against him. His friend Senator J. B. Henderson writes to him
and tells him H to whip som~body anyhow." Schofield replied
.-\pril IS, 1864, and says: "No doubt I might casily get I1p a
little claptrap on which to manufacture newspaper notoriety and
convince the Senatc of the United States that T had won a great
"ietonr and secure IllV confirmation. Such things have been done,
• •
alas, too frequcntly during this war. * * * Tanswcr that when
the management of military affairs is lcit to military men, the
rebellion will be put down very quickly, and not before. I
rather think if you let Grant alone, and let him have his own
way, he will end the waf this year." By way of introduction to
the subject he says: "]"0 have pleased the radical politicians
of that dav would ha\'e been enough to have fuined any soldier." I
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And again, "There has been llluch irrelevant discussion about
the ability or inability of c011lmanders in th~ North and Sfmth.
The fact is that political il1~tcad of military idca~ control in a
vcry large degree the selection of c0111manders in the Union
a1'1111C5: while for three whole years the authorities in \\la5h-
ingtoll could not see the necessity of unity of action in all the
armies under one military leader . .It required three years of
costly experience to teach the government that simple lesson
taught in military text books. As experience finally pron~(l.
there was 110 lack of l11en capable of leading even large armies
to victory, but, with few exceptions, they were 110t put in com-
mand until many others had been tried. Information as to
military fitness was not sought from military sources." 1
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